Working Paper

1. Mandatory US Subsidy Disclosures: Early Evidence
   with Aneesh Raghunandan, Shivaram Rajgopal, and Min Jun Song
   R&R at The Accounting Review
   • Presentations: Barcelona Accounting Summer Workshop*, Columbia Business School, Hawai’i Accounting Research Conference, Stanford GSB Tax Reading Group*
   • Coverage: Forbes
   • Abstract

     In November 2021, the Financial Accounting Standards Board passed ASC 832, mandating disclosure of government subsidy-related information in annual reports. ASC 832 did not prescribe specific measurement, recognition, or presentation guidelines, giving firms discretion to determine compliance practices. In this paper, we provide initial evidence on firms’ disclosures under the new standard. We highlight three key findings. First, both the quantity and quality of subsidy-related disclosures improved following the standard’s implementation, but improvements are concentrated in firms receiving larger subsidies or previously voluntarily disclosing subsidy-related information. Second, despite the standard’s adoption, firms do not disclose substantial subsidies, potentially dampening the standard’s impact. We leverage the observability of non-compliance, unique to our setting, to identify information withholding. Third, given ASC 832’s limited scope, public firms are increasingly pursuing subsidies not subject to the disclosure mandate. Our findings highlight both the immediate impact of the standard and shortcomings of its implementation.
2. Sequential Voluntary Disclosure
   single-authored, based on second-year paper
   R&R at The Accounting Review
   • Presentations: Columbia Business School, Columbia Accounting Theory Conference, Fourteenth Accounting Research Workshop, 2025 AAA Annual Meeting, The Second Annual Conference of the AES, NYU Stern Doctoral Seminar, 2026 FARS Midyear Meeting
   • Abstract

     Firms disclose information sequentially, responding to peers’ disclosure choices and short-term price pressures. This paper develops a dynamic model that examines how peer effects, disclosure timing, and managerial myopia jointly shape voluntary disclosure behavior. The model isolates correlation in firms’ information endowments as the primary economic force. When the timing of disclosure decisions is exogenous, the presence of a peer firm increases the ex-ante likelihood of disclosure. This effect strengthens as the correlation in information endowments increases. When one or both firms can choose the disclosure timing strategically, the equilibrium features prompt disclosure of favorable news, delayed disclosure of intermediate news, and withholding of unfavorable news. Signaling effects through timing, real-option value of disclosure deferral, and preemptive disclosure motives arise endogenously in equilibrium. Managerial myopia has opposing effects on early-date disclosure across regimes: with exogenous timing, it induces more withholding; with strategic timing, it encourages more disclosure.
3. Regulating in Name Only: The Consequences of Mutual Fund Naming Rules
   with Kalash Jain and Shivaram Rajgopal
   • Presentations: MIT Sloan*, Columbia Business School*
   • Coverage: Institutional Money
   • Abstract

     A large body of literature finds that misleading mutual fund names can distort investor allocation decisions. The SEC's Fund Names Rule, passed in 2001 and amended in 2023, aims to curb this misrepresentation by requiring fund names to reflect actual holdings. We provide the first empirical evaluation of fund and market responses to both the original rule and its amendment. Our findings reveal limited regulatory impact. Compliance rates did not improve, investors did not consistently penalize non-compliant funds with redemptions, and funds do not change their holdings or names to comply with the regulation. To better understand the lack of response, we examine whether private market stakeholders (investors and information intermediaries) are more effective at disciplining fund behavior than regulators. Funds only adjust their holdings when the market actively penalizes non-compliance, but such discipline is rare. Similarly, funds only adjust their holdings when their name does not align with Morningstar's Style Box classifications, rather than in response to SEC-defined compliance. These findings show that while disclosure regulation may hold intuitive appeal, it may be ineffective when private market forces already address transparency concerns.
4. Exploiting Myopia: The Returns to Long-Term Investing
   with Kalash Jain
   • Presentations: The University of Chicago*, Wolfe Research*, Columbia Business School, Jefferies LLC*, INSEAD*, NYU Stern*, Yale*, 2026 FARS Midyear Meeting
   • Coverage: Bloomberg, Investopedia (1), Investopedia (2), Affärsvärlden, Michael Mauboussin, The Idea Farm
   • Abstract

     Institutional investors face short-term performance pressures that constrain their ability to hold positions through temporary underperformance. We show that this myopia generates systematic mispricing in the cross-section of stocks. We introduce Horizon, a firm-level measure of active institutional holding periods, and document that long-Horizon firms earn significantly higher future returns. Consistent with a myopia-based mechanism, the Horizon premium is most pronounced among stocks that are structurally harder for short-term managers to hold and the premium attenuates when mechanically patient passive ownership is high. Exploiting a 2004 SEC regulatory change that increased interim monitoring of mutual fund managers, we find that heightened short-term pressure reduced Horizon, increased turnover, and amplified the Horizon return premium for treated firms. Overall, our results indicate that institutional myopia in delegated asset management is an economically important determinant of expected returns.
5. The Use of Debt Covenants to Curb Risk Shifting
   with Tim Baldenius
   • Presentations: Columbia Business School, Columbia Accounting Theory Conference*

Selected Work in Progress

1. What’s Said vs. What’s Expected: Information Surprise in MD&A Topics
   single-authored, first-year paper
   • Presentations: Columbia Business School
2. Demand of Environmental Funds and ESG Disclosure
   with Sonakshi Agrawal and Lisa Yao Liu

* Indicates presentations by a coauthor